Alexander Mercouris, whom I greatly respect, is partial to the possibility that the Russians might have known the Ukrainians wanted to strike Kursk and set a trap to – de-mining the border areas and moving their elite combat forces to the rear—to encourage what would amount to strategic suicide.
I thought this was indeed a real possibility in view of a report that two months ago Putin had instructed his forces to be on the alert for increased enemy activity in the region and to decrease the presence of conscript forces in vulnerable positions while beefing up special forces and combat units.
When I read the various triumphalist stories in the Western media about Russian “conscripts”--apparently border guards—being overwhelmed in the initial assault, I assumed the usual Ukrainian propaganda—which likes to portray the Russian army as a poorly-trained, poorly-equipped bunch of conscripts and recruits from prison just like the bulk of their own forces.
Every Russian male, with some exceptions, must serve in the military for one year—which is how long it takes to fully train a Russian soldier.
Therefore these “conscripts” are not sent to war although they may volunteer after for combat duty after the year of mandatory military training is complete. The closest they get to war is border guard duties, but in the event of a real assault they are instructed to withdraw in good order rather than get themselves killed.
However, as I indicated, two months ago Putin made clear he considered the entire border area a combat zone, which meant it needed deployment of fully competent combat troops to protect civilians
Were there then conscripts in Kursk? I didn’t think so. It appears there were at least some — and I was wrong. The bigger question is: where were the combat troops Putin had ordered in place?
All good analysis starts with questions and contradictions. Also, we cannot assume “reports” are true, from any source.
But in this case, we know a few things, which are verifiable..
One is that the Gerasimov is no longer in charge of the defense of Kursk.
That is Alexander Dyumin, whom the MSM dismissively refers to as Putin’s “bodyguard” . He was head of Putin’s personal security starting in 1999 and was promoted to a series of other posts, including Deputy Defense Minister, in all cases performing very competently. He is often mentioned as a possible successor to Putin.
Gerasimov is an old guard ex-Soviet officer, generally regarded as good at what he does – but, of course used to a military which in the Yeltsin years. became famously corrupt and factionalized. Prigozhin and Kadyrov were highly critical of Gerasimov as were many others.
This year at least four Russian generals have been brought up on corruption charges.
Shoigu got kicked upstairs and replaced by the “incorruptible” Belosouv and now it is likely that it will be Gerasimov’s turn. Putin is not “shuffling the deck” as the West Media likes to say—rather, with the war preceding as it is and victory within sight, Putin is reform the very structure of the military —creating a new martial culture – one which has no place for factionalism and self-interest.
Prigozhin managed to get away with mutiny, which in most countries would have put him in prison for life or before a firing squad. It didn’t happen Putin also clearly considered “extenuating factors”—namely Priggy’s patriotism and the degree to which his criticisms of the General Staff were correct.
Of course, ever the pragmatist, he would not undermine his military operation in Ukraine with a major shakeup of the General Staff at that point.
But clearly—especially with the death of Prigozhin — he must have realized that the Russian military needed an upgrade.
Now, with the Kursk incursion, it is clear that Western Ukraine is finished--demilitarized, depopulated – and soon denazified.
Like Japan in 1945, it is mounting suicide attacks and vowing to fight to the last—before it surrenders unconditionally.
However, while Japan became a vassal state – still occupied, still on its knees Ukraine will become part of the Russian Federation—and therefore an equal partner. Some oblasts could become ”union” states —but would be still equal partners in the New Russia..
The Russian military will play its role once the war is finished in keeping the peace and ensuring an orderly transition to good governance – but that requires gifted administrators like Belousuv and Dyumin --21st Century men. Not men like Shoigu or Gerasimov who belong to another era.
Notes
If you are looking for background on this article, I suggest you check out Nima’s interview with Dmitri Orlov. And also Gilbert Doctorow’s articles.
A lot of work today, to meet the Shelter’s requirements, preparing my apartment for Chappy. Even getting letters of recommendation. Then comes the one month trial! As with all feral cats, it takes a while to earn trust. But he is playful and sweet-tempered. So, I am confident, Ichi will have a little brother and I will have a new friend.
Many thanks to all those who donated coffees to help and my friends!
Special Report next week.
\You can donate coffees to support us and get on the mailing list for the Special Report HERE.
My impression is that Shoigu is not a bad egg but didn't run a very tight ship, too tolerant of a tradition of corruption by his underlings. I may be completely wrong.
Thank you for this rational explanation. I've seen too much hype in the last few days to be able to get any sense where things stand.