Larry Johnson 2+2=5

Against the AltMedia grain

2+2=5 is a mathematician’s joke. It is a metaphor for synergy, as above. It applies especially to Game Theory, and by extension to LLMs.

I have written a number of times about the use and abuse of LLMs as if they were “intelligent”, which they are not. It is difficult to use LLMs properly without good prior knowledge of a given subject or enquiry and also of how LLMs operate, keeping in mind that they all use the same methods.

This applies widely to “Game Theory” which is not one all encompassing theory, whatever you took away from the movie A Beautiful Mind which is about a mathematician who wrote up the math for one rather limited behavioral model with assumptions about rational action, ignoring the fact that we are not rational actors.

Proof of that?

Donald Trump and his war with Iran.

Also Israel and its quest for Armageddon.

So I criticized Simplicius for citing “game theory” and also the Fake Professor, sometime Asimov fan, and failed prophet, Jiang. They don’t know what they are talking about.

Now, I have to take Larry Johnson to task. He just wrote an article using, he says, “AI”s /”LLMs” to answer this question”.

Larry: “Using game theory, explain the best course of action that Iran should pursue when confronted with the threat of a nuclear attack from Israel.”

I used Chrome’s very good LLM, working through it, drawing on my knowledge of game theory models (there are many). I left out Russian Game theory because Western LLMs don’t have good access to non-English materials.

LJ concludes the best option is for Iran to get nuclear weapons secretly—and fast!. That is using the Prisoner’s Dilemma model, the first iteration of Nash’s equilibrium.

This assumes:

• All parties are rational actors

• Iran cannot win by conventional means.

These things are clearly not the case!

Applying game theory to the nuclear standoff between Iran and Israel reveals a complex strategic landscape where the “best” course of action for Iran depends on its risk tolerance and its perception of Israeli resolve. Analysts frequently use several core models to explain this dynamic:

1. The Game of Chicken

In this model, two actors move toward a catastrophic confrontation.

• The Scenario: Both sides “drive” toward each other; the one who swerves is the “chicken” (loses prestige), but if neither swerves, both perish (nuclear exchange).

• Iran’s Strategic Move: Iran has historically used this dynamic to advance its nuclear capabilities just below the threshold of triggering a direct strike, betting that Israel or the U.S. will “swerve” to avoid a regional war.

• The Risk: This relies on brinkmanship. If Iran miscalculates Israel’s “red lines,” it risks a preemptive strike before it can establish its own deterrent.

2. Deterrence and the “Onus of the Weaker Actor”

Game theory suggests that in asymmetric conflicts, the weaker party is responsible for maintaining the equilibrium of deterrence.

• Cost Imposition: Iran’s best course is often to signal that any attack will result in “intolerable harm” to the stronger side.

• Proxy Strategy: To make this threat credible without owning nuclear weapons, Iran uses the Axis of Resistance (proxies like Hezbollah) to ensure Israel faces high costs for any escalation.

• Collapse of Deterrence: If these proxies are neutralized, Iran’s traditional deterrent “collapses,” forcing it to either back down or accelerate toward a nuclear breakout to regain leverage.

3. Mixed Strategy and Nuclear Breakout

Calculations regarding a “nuclear breakout” often involve a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium, where actors randomize their actions to keep the opponent uncertain.

Institute For Science And International Security +1

• Optimal Probability: Some models suggest Iran’s best strategy is to move toward a weapon less than 50% of the time to keep Israel’s “strike” payoff low.

• Secret Weaponization: A high-risk “best” move is a “mad rush” to complete a weapon in secret before detection. However, game theory warns this is dangerous because if Israel perceives a breakout is imminent, its rational move is a massive preemptive strike.

4. Tit-for-Tat and the Escalation Ladder

Iran often employs a Tit-for-Tat strategy—retaliating to strikes but quickly returning to cooperation if the opponent stops.

• The Goal: Establish “rules of the game” where both sides understand the cost of every action, maintaining an uneasy equilibrium.

• The Danger: This fails if both sides use different metrics for “equivalence.” For example, if Israel counts the number of missiles fired but Iran counts the damage caused, the “Tit-for-Tat” loop can spiral into unintended total war.

J: This seems to be game theory using the Nash equilibrium. There are other equilibriums. ARe the results different?

Yes, shifting the “equilibrium” concept significantly alters the predicted best course of action for Iran. While a

Nash Equilibrium assumes everyone knows everyone else’s strategy and won’t change their own, other models account for misinformation, sequential moves, and psychological biases.

Here is how different equilibria change the strategic results for Iran:

1. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Incorporating Uncertainty)

In a standard Nash model, both sides have “perfect information.” In a Bayesian Equilibrium, players act based on beliefs about the other’s “type” (e.g., Is Israel “hawkish” or “restrained”?).

• The Result: Iran’s best move is Strategic Misrepresentation. If Iran can convince Israel it is more willing to retaliate than it actually is, it can deter an attack even without a nuclear weapon.

• The Shift: The focus moves from actual capability to signaling and perceived resolve.

2. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (Sequential Moves)

Nash Equilibrium often looks at a single, simultaneous “snapshot.” Subgame Perfect Equilibrium uses Backward Induction to look at the conflict as a “tree” of moves and counter-moves.

• The Result: Iran must consider if its threat to retaliate is “credible.” If Israel knows that Iran’s retaliation would lead to its own total destruction, Israel may conclude Iran’s threat is a “hollow” one and strike anyway.

• The Shift: Iran’s best course becomes Pre-commitment—taking actions that make retaliation automatic (like “tripwire” forces), so Israel cannot assume Iran will “rationally” back down later.

3. Quantal Response Equilibrium (Accounting for Human Error)

This equilibrium assumes players are “boundedly rational”—they try to pick the best move but occasionally make “noisy” or suboptimal mistakes.

• The Result: Iran’s best course is to increase safety margins. In a standard Nash model, you can dance right on the edge of a “red line.” In a Quantal Response model, you must stay further back because there is a statistical probability that the opponent will “slip” and strike by accident or miscalculation.

• The Shift: The “best” action changes from maximal brinkmanship to risk-aversion.

4. Prospect Theory (Psychological Equilibrium)

Though strictly a behavioral model, it identifies a “Loss Aversion” equilibrium. Actors are more likely to take extreme risks to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain.

• The Result: If Iran perceives that losing its nuclear infrastructure is a “certain loss,” it may choose a highly irrational, high-risk “breakout” even if the mathematical odds of success are low.

• The Shift: The outcome moves from stable deterrence to volatile escalation.

J: Which of these models sees Iranian development of nuclear weapons as the best choice?

Most game theory models view the “best” course of action as Iran staying at the threshold (having the capability without the weapon) to avoid a preemptive strike. Ony two specific frameworks interpret full development as the “best” or most rational choice.

1. Prospect Theory (The “Domain of Losses”)

According to Prospect Theory, actors become significantly more risk-seeking when they perceive themselves to be in a “domain of losses”.

• The Logic: If the Iranian leadership believes that their regime’s survival is already doomed by conventional threats, internal unrest, or crippling sanctions, the “certain loss” of the status quo becomes less acceptable than the “gamble” of nuclear breakout.

• The Choice: In this mindset, developing a nuclear weapon is the “best” choice because it offers the only (albeit high-risk) path to a “win” (total security and regime survival), whereas any other move leads to a guaranteed “loss”.

2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (Security Dilemma)

In a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, the “best” individual move (the dominant strategy) is to defect (build the weapon) regardless of what the other player does.

• The Logic: If Iran builds a weapon and Israel does not, Iran gains a massive strategic advantage. If both build/maintain weapons, they reach a Nash Equilibrium of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” which is still safer for the regime than a scenario where Israel has nuclear weapons and Iran has none.

• The Choice: Because Iran cannot fully trust Israel or the U.S. to never attack, the only way to ensure they aren’t the “sucker” in the game is to build their own deterrent.

3. Structural Realism (Pre-commitment to Survival)

While not a pure game theory model, Structural Realism often uses game-theoretic logic to argue that in an “anarchic” international system, the only rational “best” choice for a threatened state is self-help through the ultimate deterrent.

• The Logic: Relying on “threshold” status is seen as a weak Subgame Perfect Equilibrium because it invites constant sabotage and “salami slicing” tactics from opponents.

• The Choice: Full weaponization is the only move that permanently changes the “game board,” forcing opponents to treat Iran as a peer rather than a target.

J: Given the differences between different game theoretical models, what then would be a consensus view of best strategy for Iran if is winning the war by conventional means. Should it secretly build nuclear weapons?

In game theory, if Iran were winning a conventional war against Israel, the consensus view suggests that secretly building nuclear weapons would likely be a suboptimal or “losing” strategy.

While it seems counterintuitive to not “finish the job” with a nuclear deterrent, most strategic models—including Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium—point toward maintaining threshold status rather than full weaponization for the following reasons:

1. Avoiding the “Winner’s Curse” (Preemptive Escalation)

In a sequential game, if Iran is winning conventionally, it has already achieved its primary goal: security and leverage.

• The Risk: Attempting a secret nuclear breakout creates a new “subgame” where Israel’s rational response to an existential threat is an immediate, all-out nuclear first strike.

• The Outcome: By trying to add a nuclear “win” to a conventional “win,” Iran risks turning a favorable status quo into total destruction.

2. The Stability-Instability Paradox

This concept suggests that while nuclear weapons prevent major wars, they can actually encourage conventional conflicts because both sides know they won’t escalate to nukes.

• The Strategic Play: If Iran is already winning conventionally, it is benefiting from the absence of a nuclear exchange.

• The Danger: Introducing nuclear weapons into the equation actually destabilizes this advantage, as it may force a desperate opponent (Israel) to use its own nuclear arsenal before it loses its conventional ability to do so.

3. Hedging as a Dominant Strategy

Most analysts, including those using Expected Utility models, argue that “hedging” (staying weeks away from a bomb) is Iran’s dominant strategy.

• Leverage: Threshold status provides almost all the diplomatic “carrots” (sanctions relief) and “sticks” (deterrence) of a bomb without the international pariah status or the risk of a preemptive strike.

• Conventional Synergy: A conventional victory proves that Iran’s current asymmetric strategy (missiles and proxies) works. Adding nukes would likely unify the international community against them, stripping away the diplomatic gains of their victory.

Summary: Why Not Secretly Build?

Conclusion: If Iran is winning conventionally, game theory suggests the “best” move is to stop at the threshold. This allows them to consolidate their gains while keeping the “nuclear card” as a permanent threat that deters others from intervening.

J: Conclusion

Larry’s article illustrates the tendency of podcasters to spend most of their time doing interviews with “friends”, people with large followings online, collecting clicks. They may be very smart—smarter than me — but they don’t have time to do proper analysis.

Now, I respect Larry Johnson, and I love his shirts and his dogs —but sometimes I wonder if he is more a kind of of Alt Media Talk Show host and less an analyst. Everybody is concerned about the issues he and his buddies talk about and the often interesting things they say— but do we really come away more informed? How often are their predictions right?

On the other hand, I enjoy Sonar 21!

The idea of acquiring nuclear weapons to keep the US at bay is an old one that has been around since 2003 —and certainly it worked very well for North Korea —but in the current circumstances, it is both unnecessary and impractical for Iran.

LLMs and “Game Theory” are trendy — but don’t tell us much.

There are simply too many factors to consider in this war.

However, at this point, Iran is winning. An Iranian nuclear weapon might stop the war in its tracks — then again, it might (worst case) start a nuclear war .

Destroying US and Israeli forces and their bases in a conventional war and realizing regime change in the Arab world on the other hand is to the benefit of everyone.

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These two little sisters are bonded.

This sometimes happen. For example,Ichi had two sisters (Ni and San), who were a pair. Poor Ichi had to attach himself to two older male cats because Ni and San played with each other and cuddle with each other. Ni and San were adopted together by a family and are very happy.

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